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Abstract
Three experiments were conducted to investigate the effects of working memory content on temporal attention in a rapid
serial visual presentation attentional blink paradigm. It was shown that categorical similarity between working memory
content and the target stimuli pertaining to the attentional task (both digits) increased attentional blink magnitude
compared to a condition in which this similarity was absent (colors and digits, respectively). This effect was only observed
when the items in working memory were not presented as conjunctions of the involved categories (i.e., colored digits). This
suggested that storage and retrieval from working memory was at least preferentially conjunctive in this case. It was
furthermore shown that the content of working memory enhanced the identification rate of the second target, by means of
repetition priming, when inter-target lag was short and the attentional blink was in effect. The results are incompatible with
theories of temporal attention that assume working memory has no causal role in the attentional blink and support theories
that do.
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Introduction
Attention cannot be deployed efficiently to more than one
perceptual event within about 500 ms. The attentional blink
phenomenon illustrates this difficulty in a steep drop in successful
report of the second of two briefly presented visual target stimuli
during this critical interval [1,2]. The precise source of this
temporal limit on attention is a matter of some debate (for an
overview, see [3]). Several influential theories of temporal
attention have attributed a crucial role to memory consolidation
[4–7]. In these and similar accounts, basic visual feature
perception can operate in parallel for multiple stimuli, but more
elaborate processing, such as associated with memory consolida-
tion, binding, (object) identification and response selection, cannot.
The essence of these accounts is a division between two phases or
stages of processing; an early stage that is more or less capable of
processing several stimuli simultaneously without strong interfer-
ence, and a subsequent late stage that is not (i.e., it is serial). In an
attentional blink task, when the observer is processing the first
target and consequently unable to put the second target stimulus
through this late processing phase (the ‘‘second stage’’), and
thereby consolidate it to some degree, its partially processed
features suffer from decay and interference as they linger in the
early processing stage. Thus, the loss of information in the parallel
stage is caused indirectly by the bottleneck in the serial processing
stage, and so gives rise to the attentional blink.
This view has been challenged by models that more or less
explicitly claim they do not need to suppose such ‘capacity
limitations’ on the perceptual processing that pertains to the
attentional blink [8,9]. These models of the attentional blink
instead attribute an important role to the inhibition of distracting
stimuli on the one hand and the selection of the target stimuli on
the other. In the model by Di Lollo and colleagues [8], the
attentional set necessary to select the target stimuli is thought to
require continuous maintenance from an executive control
function. According to this model, the control function is also
needed to process the target stimuli, so that the attentional set
becomes vulnerable when the control function is needed to process
the first target. The arrival of a distractor stimulus then triggers a
switch of the attentional set, thus causing the blink. Somewhat
similar mechanisms are modeled by Olivers & Meeter [9], in that
the target stimulus is thought to elicit a transient ‘boost’ of
attention, and the subsequent distractor elicits an opposite,
inhibitory response. Because the boost mechanism is somewhat
slow, it ends up boosting the distractor stimulus that follows on the
first target. This in turn requires a stronger-than-usual inhibition
response, which is thought to constitute the attentional blink.
Arguments in favor of both ‘camps’ have been brought forward.
Against strict capacity limitations, based on the number of
individual stimuli, speak results related to Lag 1 sparing, which
is the absence of the blink if the two targets follow each other
immediately, without intervening distractors. It has been shown
that Lag 1 sparing can be extended in time, if observers are asked
to report an uninterrupted sequence of targets; no attentional blink
is evident from such sequences [8,10]. However, capacity-based
models could explain the report of multiple sequential targets by
referring to chunking mechanisms that would allow multiple
stimuli to be part of one larger representation in memory. Against
distractor-based accounts speak studies that showed residual AB
effects on sequential targets when data showing extended sparing
were analyzed with a strict method to control for multiple target
contingencies [11, see also 12], and studies showing that the
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targets [13,14]. Still, one could suppose that a distractor is not
strictly necessary if the decay of the attentional set over time was
fast enough, or if the absence of a distractor could also be sufficient
to trigger an inhibitory response under certain conditions. Thus,
the debate has not been settled conclusively (for a hybrid state-of-
the-art model, see [15]).
A fairly direct test of the assumptions of these two types of
models is to examine the impact of working memory load on
attentional deployment. Models assuming that memory consoli-
dation is (part of) a limited, serial process, which underlies the
blink, would predict that increased load on memory should
modulate blink magnitude. Models that do without this assump-
tion of limited processing would not predict such modulation.
Several studies on the interaction between working memory and
temporal attention have been reported. Some showed that
working memory load increased overall task difficulty, but showed
no modulation of blink magnitude as determined by a relative
increase of difficulty at short temporal lag between targets,
compared to long lag [16,17]. Likewise, in a test of individual
differences, measures of working memory capacity failed to
correlate with blink magnitude [18]. However, other studies did
show blink-specific modulation of attention by memory load in
behavioral and electrophysiological paradigms [19,20] (for mem-
ory encoding difficulty see also [21]), as well as in correlations
between individual operational working memory span and the
blink [22,23]. The reason for the discrepant findings seems to lie in
the processing mode of working memory required at the time of
attentional deployment. In the studies that showed no relation
between working memory and the blink, observers were asked
only to maintain items in memory for recall later, or were tested on
memory capacity mostly. In the positive studies, observers had to
access memory when the first target appeared (to perform a
matching task), or were tested on operational span more explicitly.
This suggested that active use or access of memory is required for
the interaction between memory and temporal attention to
appear.
From this literature it can be concluded that these studies do in
principle support (operational) memory-based models of the
attentional blink, but also leave some questions unanswered. First,
the possibility remains open that it is not working memory
involvement per se that is the critical factor, but an executive
function that might also be involved in accessing or updating
working memory. In the model by Di Lollo and colleagues [8], a
function of this kind is deemed necessary to process the targets and
to maintain the attentional set. Second, in the Akyu ¨rek, Hommel,
and Jolicœur [19] study, the need to match the identity of the first
target to the contents of working memory may be construed as
potentially involving a switch in attentional set or filter (sometimes
also referred to as a ‘‘gate’’). Such a reset of the attentional filter
could potentially have a blink effect in the model by Olivers and
Meeter [9]. The same confusion between attentional switching
ability and memory operations may be supposed to underlie
individual ability tests as well. One might thus again assume that it
is not working memory involvement that is at the core of the
reported interference, but rather this demand on the attentional
filtering function. This account does necessitate the additional
assumption that a larger memory set translates into a prolonged
involvement of the attentional gate, and thereby leads to an
increased attentional blink.
The purpose of the present study was to take away the potential
source confusion between working memory and executive or
attentional gating functions, and thereby to settle the issue of
working memory involvement as a fundamental factor in the
attentional blink. This was realized by implementing two working
memory conditions that each should involve executive and gating
functions in a similar way (i.e., increasing involvement of the
executive or prolonged gate switching), but should be different
from a memory perspective. In particular, one condition featured
categorical similarity between the items in working memory and
those relevant to the attentional part of the task (alphanumeric
characters), whereas the other did not (colors). In terms of the
working memory model proposed by Baddeley [24], the color and
alphanumeric information could be held in different subsystems
(the visuospatial sketchpad and the phonological loop, respective-
ly). Therefore, increased interference between the alphanumeric
attentional task and the alphanumeric working memory task was
expected in the form of an increased attentional blink, compared
to the condition that featured a color memory task.
Methods
Experiment 1
The aim of Experiment 1 was to establish whether the type of
content in working memory has an effect on the efficiency of
attentional deployment. To this end, two types of working memory
content were used in a memory-attention dual task similar to the
one used by Akyu ¨rek, Hommel, and Jolicœur [19]. In this task,
observers are asked to match T1 to a previously presented memory
set, and it was shown that such access to memory interferes with
the processing of T2. The first type of working memory content
used presently was different from the type of items used in the
attentional task; participants were asked to remember a number of
colors and to attend to two alphanumeric targets in a rapid serial
visual presentation (RSVP). The second type of content was
similar to that used in the attentional task (without repeating the
actual items); participants were asked to remember alphanumeric
stimuli and attend to (other) alphanumeric stimuli in the RSVP.
The prediction was that if the type of content (that is actively
accessed) in memory matters to attentional deployment, a
difference between these two conditions should be observable on
the identification performance on the second target.
Participants. Thirty-four students of psychology (23 female,
11 male) at the University of Groningen participated in the
experiment for course credit. Participants were unaware of the
purpose of the experiment and reported normal or corrected-to-
normal vision. Informed consent was obtained in writing and the
study was approved by the Ethical Committee Psychology (ECP)
of the University of Groningen before it was conducted. Mean age
was 20.4 years, with a range between 18–32 years. Five
participants were excluded from analysis because their
performance on the second task (conditional on T1, see below)
fell below the pre-specified cut-off value of 10% correct in one or
more of the experimental conditions. This value was chosen to
exclude participants who misunderstood the task, or for whom the
task was clearly too difficult. Mean age of the remaining 29
participants (19 female, 10 male) was 20.7 years, with the same
range as the full sample.
Apparatus and stimuli. Participants were seated
individually in a dimly lit testing cabin. The distance from their
chair to the 22’’ CRT screen on which the stimuli were presented
was approximately 50 cm. The screen refreshed at 100 Hz at a
resolution of 800 by 600 pixels in 16 bit color. The experiment was
programmed in PST E-Prime 1.2 and ran on a computer running
the Microsoft Windows XP operating system. Responses were
recorded with a standard keyboard. A light gray background
(RGB 192, 192, 192) was maintained throughout all trials of the
experiment. Stimuli consisted of letters and digits, which were
Working Memory Content and the Attentional Blink
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fixation cross (‘‘+’’) in bold 18 pt. font. The digits were drawn
randomly without replacement from 2–9, and the letters from the
full alphabet. The stimuli were mostly presented in black (RGB 0,
0, 0), except for the targets and the items in the memory set. The
items in the memory set each had a unique color, drawn from the
standard 16-color palette, with the exclusion of black, dark gray
(RGB 128, 128, 128), light gray (identical to the background
color), and red (RGB 255, 0, 0). Depending on the experimental
condition, the first stimulus could either match the color of one of
the items from the memory set, or have another unique color from
this set (i.e., in the no-match condition). The second target
stimulus was always red.
Procedure and design. The experiment had a total of 768
experimental trials divided between 4 blocks, and 48 practice
trials. The experimental trials were self-paced and initiated by
pressing Enter. At 100 ms after the start of the trial the memory
set was shown for 1000 ms, followed by a blank screen for
700 ms. The memory set consisted of either 1 or 4 digits,
depending on the experimental condition. The probability of each
was 50%, and was otherwise randomly drawn. The digits in the
memory set each had a unique color (specified above). Depending
on the task instructions for the current block, which were shown
before the start of each block, participants were asked to
memorize either the colors, or the identities of the digits in the
set (50% probability, presented in counter-balanced blocks). After
offset of the memory set, the fixation cross appeared for 200 ms,
after which two synchronized and simultaneous stimulus streams
started. The streams consisted of 20 frames, each visible for
50 ms, and followed by a blank interval of 50 ms. The two target
stimuli (T1 and T2) in these streams were digits, drawn from 2-9,
while the remaining distractor items were letters drawn separately
for each of the two streams from the full alphabet. T2 was never
the same digit as T1, nor the same as any digit presented in the
memory set. The streams were aligned to the center of the screen
and 128 pixels apart on the horizontal axis. T1 appeared at the
fifth or the seventh position in the stream, and could appear in
either the left or the right stream. T2 followed T1 at a lag of 1, 3,
or 8, and could appear in either the left or the right stream
independently. As before, these possibilities were evenly
distributed across all conditions and presented in a randomly
drawn trial sequence. A 100 ms blank screen was shown after the
streams had ended, after which two successive prompts asked
participants to enter their responses to T1 and T2, respectively.
The prompts remained on screen for 1500 ms each, or until a
response was given. To indicate whether T1 was also part of the
memory set, participants were instructed to press the 1 key
(labeled with a sticker that depicted a triangle) if it was, and the 0
key (labeled with a square) if it was not. In the color task
condition, T1 should be considered part of the memory set if it
had the same color as one of the items from the set, regardless of
its identity. In the identity task, the digit presented as T1 should
match one of the items from the set, regardless of its color. T2
could be identified by pressing the corresponding number
between 2 and 9 on the keyboard. The experimental design is
illustrated in Figure 1.
Accuracy was analyzed in a repeated measures analysis of
variance with three variables. The first variable was T1-T2 Lag
(levels 1, 3, and 8), the second variable was Load (1 or 4 items),
and the third variable was Task (color or identity). T2 accuracy
was computed as the percentage of correctly identified stimuli,
given that the response to T1 was correct (T2|T1). In case of
significant tests of sphericity, the degrees of freedom were adjusted
using the Greenhouse-Geisser epsilon correction.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 was designed to isolate the task-relevant feature of
the stimuli that were part of the memory set. Thus, when the task
for the observers was to memorize colors, the items in the memory
set were small colored discs. When the task was to memorize
(alphanumeric) identity, the items were changed to digits. If the
null effect on T2 performance for the Task variable found in
Experiment 1 (see Results section below) persists even when the
possible effect of these conjunctions is removed, it would support
the idea that the contents of memory do not matter for attentional
deployment in RSVP. Conversely, if a differential effect for the
color and identity tasks is found with these simplified stimuli, it
would provide evidence against the aforementioned account.
Participants. Nineteen new students (7 female, 12 male)
participated in the experiment. Recruitment and selection
procedures were identical to those in Experiment 1. Mean age
was 20.8 years (range 19–24 years). One female participant was
excluded from analysis by the same criterion as was used in
Experiment 1. The mean age of the remaining eighteen
participants was 20.6 years, again with identical range.
Apparatus and procedure. Experiment 2 was identical to
Experiment 1, with the exception that colored discs were
introduced to replace the colored digits in the memory set in the
color task. The discs were otherwise uniform in appearance and
similar in size to the digits they replaced.
Experiment 3
In Experiment 3, a test of repetition priming was implemented.
Depending on the Prime condition, one of the items from the
memory set could be repeated as T2. The logic of this design was
that if the contents of memory matter for temporal attention, a
priming effect of this repetition may be expected and alleviate the
Figure 1. The experimental procedure as used in Experiment 1.
The trial is depicted from the onset of the memory set (100 ms after
trial start) until the onset of the response screens (max. 1500 ms each).
One or more similar frames are indicated with dots (‘‘…’’). The colors are
not meant to precisely reflect the actual RGB values used in the
experiment and are provided for illustration purposes only.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016696.g001
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a main effect). If this effect is indeed observed, it would provide
additional evidence that the interaction between memory and
attention is content-driven, and not due to accessory systems
(executive control or attentional gating). Note that the nature of
priming implemented here was specifically tied to the memory set
and the second target, and was independent of and orthogonal to
the identity of T1. There was furthermore no opportunity for
response priming effects to occur, as the responses to T1 and T2
were of a different kind (cf., [25]).
Participants. Nineteen new students (9 female, 10 male)
participated in this experiment. The recruitment procedures and
requirements were identical to those used in Experiment 1. Mean
age was 21.6 years (range 18–29 years). Two participants (1
female, 1 male) were excluded from analysis using the same
criterion as before. The mean age of the remaining 17 participants
was 21.7 years, with the same range.
Apparatus and procedure. Experiment 3 was mostly
identical to Experiment 1, except for the following differences.
The memory set size of 1 was replaced by set size 2. This was
necessary so that an item from the memory set could always be
repeated as T2, without being identical to T1, even in case T1
matched an item from the memory set. The items from the
memory set as well as T1 were now always red, and T2 was now
black. The Task variable was replaced by the Prime variable
(present or absent), indicating whether an item from the memory
set was repeated as T2. This was the case in half the trials, which
were again randomly mixed. As before, T1 and T2 were never
identical. Finally, the Lag 1 condition was removed to reduce
session time. The total number of trials came to 512, with an
additional 32 practice trials.
Results
Experiment 1
Performance on T1 was affected by Lag, F(2, 56)=26.85, MSE
=.003, p,.001, Load, F(1, 28)=58.9, MSE =.027, p,.001, and
Task F(1, 28) =5.91, MSE =.055, p,.05. The lag effect on T1
showed classic competitive interference between T1 and T2 at Lag
1, where T1 performance dropped slightly to 64.6%, compared to
68.1% at Lag 3, and 69.5% at Lag 8 (cf., [26,27]). Memory load
also affected T1 in a predictable way; performance was better at
low load (74.1%) than at high load (60.7%). Finally, the identity
task was easier than the color task (70.4% vs. 64.3%). The
interaction between Lag and Task was marginally significant, F(2,
56)=2.6, MSE =.003, p,.09. If anything, the interaction
suggested that the difference between tasks was smaller at Lag 1
(4.4% difference in favor of the identity task) than at Lag 3 (7.4%)
and Lag 8 (6.5%). None of the other interactions were reliable
(F’s,2.2). The left panel of Figure 2 shows average performance
on T1 as a function of Lag.
Performance on T2|T1 was similarly affected by Lag, F(2, 56)
=48, MSE =.022, p,.001, and Load, F(1, 28) =27.18, MSE
=.01, p,.001, but not by Task, F,1.8. The attentional blink was
evident from the Lag effect, with performance reaching a low at
Lag 3 (70.8%), compared to its peak at Lag 8 (88.3%). Lag 1
performance (73.2%) was slightly higher than it was at Lag 3,
suggesting that a degree of Lag 1 sparing took place (see also [28]).
The Load effect was straightforward; performance on trials with
low memory load averaged 80.3%, compared to 74.6% on trials
with high load. The interaction between Lag and Load was also
reliable, F(2, 56) =5.26, MSE =.005, p,.01. The interaction
replicated the previously found result that memory load affects the
attentional blink specifically [19]. The performance drop from low
to high memory load at Lag 3 was 8.8%, compared to 5.3% at Lag
1, and 2.9% at Lag 8. The interaction between Lag and Task was
again marginally significant, F(2, 56) =2.72, MSE =.005, p,.08.
The direction of this trend was that the differences due to Task
were larger at Lag 1 (3.9% in favor of the identity task) than at Lag
3 (1.6%) or Lag 8 (20.6%). None of the other interaction terms
reached significance (F’s,1). The right panel of Figure 2 plots T2
performance as a function of Lag.
The data for the analysis of T2 performance were furthermore
split between trials in which T1 matched the memory set and trials
in which it did not. Though some numerical changes in the means
were evident, this analysis did not change the pattern of results
presented here. Overall, the results of the experiment were clear.
First, the interaction between memory load and the attentional
blink was replicated. Second, the color task was sufficiently
difficult, so that performance on T1 was even lower than in the
identity task, with a similar tendency showing for T2 performance.
Despite the presence of these pre-requisite effects, there was no
evidence for reliable differential effects of the memory task on
attentional selection (i.e., the attentional blink was not affected by
the Task variable). A possible explanation for these findings is that
the interaction between the memory task and the attentional blink
is due to a bottleneck at the level of control mechanisms, which
may be required not only to deploy attention but also to access or
update memory. In this scenario, the contents of working memory
could be entirely inconsequential to the degree of interference that
is observed between the tasks. This conclusion is as of yet
premature, however, as there is another possible explanation for
the present findings. In the current implementation of the color
task, the items that were to be memorized were always
conjunctions, that is, they contained both color and alphanumeric
information. As is known from the Stroop interference effect [29],
it is very difficult to ignore the alphanumeric property and focus
on the stimulus color alone. Therefore, the possibility exists that no
difference was found because the observers encoded and accessed
the memory items by their conjunctions, rather than by the
currently task-relevant property (i.e., color or identity) only. In
order to examine this possibility, Experiment 2 was designed to
remove the conjunctive nature of the memory items.
Experiment 2
As before, there were significant effects of Lag, F(2, 34) =6.5,
MSE =.002, p,.005, Load, F(1, 17) =58.32, MSE =.007,
p,.001, and Task F(1, 17) =55.99, MSE =.099, p,.001, on T1.
T1 performance was slightly lower at Lag 1 (58.2%), compared to
Lag 3 (60.8%) and Lag 8 (60.5%), replicating Experiment 1. The
load effect was also replicated with higher performance (64.2%)
under low memory load, compared to high load (55.5%). Finally,
the color task averaged substantially lower performance on T1
(43.9%) than the identity task (75.8%). With regards to this
performance, it should be noted here that the response screens to
T1 and T2 were both time-limited to 1500 ms, and participants
were not explicitly encouraged to guess in case they were uncertain
about the targets. Trials on which no response was logged were
classified as incorrect. Thus, even though there were only two
response options for T1 (match or no match), it was possible for
performance to drop below 50% due to trials on which no
response was given. As mentioned, on the critical measure of T2
performance, analyses were performed with the prerequisite that
T1 was correct. The left panel of Figure 3 plots T1 performance as
a function of Lag.
There were reliable main effects of Lag, F(2, 34) =31.44, MSE
=.016, p,.001, and Load, F(1, 17) =17.42, MSE =.01, p,.001,
on T2|T1 accuracy. At the same time, Task had no overall effect
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and 89.6% at Lag 8, reflecting an attentional blink with a degree
of Lag 1 sparing, which was similar to Experiment 1. Performance
with low memory load averaged 83.2%, while high memory load
resulted in 77.4%. As expected, Lag and Load also interacted, F(2,
34)=6.66, MSE =.004, p,.005. High load impaired performance
mostly at the short lags (6.8% difference at Lag 1, and 8.8% at Lag
3), compared to Lag 8 (1.7% difference). There was no reliable
interaction between Lag and Task (F,2.5). Critically, however,
the interaction between Task and Load was significant, F(1, 17)
=6.39, MSE =.011, p,.05. The interaction reflected a clear
differential effect; memory load had a strong effect in the identity
task, lowering performance by 9.4%, while in the color task this
effect was only 2.2% in size. This was the case even though
Figure 2. Identification accuracy in percent correct in Experiment 1. The left panel shows T1 performance, and the right panel shows T2
performance, given that T1 was correctly responded to (T2|T1), plotted as a function of T1-T2 Lag. Black symbols represent the identity task and white
symbols represent the color task. Solid lines represent high memory load and dotted lines represent low memory load.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016696.g002
Figure 3. Identification accuracy in percent correct in Experiment 2. The left panel shows T1 performance, and the right panel shows T2
performance, given that T1 was correctly responded to (T2|T1), plotted as a function of T1-T2 Lag. Figure conventions are identical to those of
Figure 2.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016696.g003
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identity task, and 79.8% in the color task). Finally, the three-way
interaction between Lag, Load, and Task was also reliable, F(2,
34) =4.56, MSE =.003, p,.05. This effect indicated that the
differences due to the Task by Load interaction were restricted to
the short lags. At Lag 8, the Load effect was comparable between
the identity and color tasks (2.6% and 0.7% difference,
respectively). At Lag 1 this was not the case, with a difference of
10% in the identity task, and 4.7% in the color task. Even more so,
at Lag 3, the difference was 15.5% in the identity task, compared
to 2.2% in the color task. When tested individually, neither of the
differences in the color task were reliable (t,1.6). The right panel
of Figure 3 plots T2 performance as a function of Lag.
The results of Experiment 2 were straightforward: When
participants were accessing color information from memory, it
did not increase the magnitude of the attentional blink, whereas
retrieving alphanumeric information did increase blink magnitude.
The effect was such, that even though the color task was noticeably
more difficult (as can be seen from the means on T1), the blink was
more pronounced in the identity task, that is, performance
dropped below that of the color task. Thus, it would seem that the
content of working memory does indeed interact with attentional
deployment. Accessing information that is part of a different
memory subsystem (i.e., visual memory vs. alphanumeric memory)
does not impair attentional performance, while accessing the same
type of information does (even without stimulus repetition).
These results are incompatible with the idea that generic
executive control mechanisms or attentional gating functions are
the bottleneck underlying the interaction between working
memory and the attentional blink. Yet, there may be another
possibility to salvage these accounts. One might assume that
executive control functions or attentional gates could themselves
be subdivided between different item categories or memory
systems. Thus, although one control function may be used to
process alphanumeric stimuli, another may be responsible for
visual (color) information. Similarly, it could be assumed that
searching for a digit amidst letter distractors is ‘dangerously’
similar to searching for a matching digit in a memory set, so that a
careful attentional switch is needed, which might increase
interference. The present data do not argue against these
explanations. In order to fully establish a link between the
contents of working memory and attention, it is necessary to
establish the existence of content-driven effects in a situation that
does not involve switching between different types of attentional
gate. Although the existence of content-driven effects within a
single attentional set would not per se disqualify the multiple-gate
account as an account for the results so far, it would certainly
become quite unparsimonious at the least.
Experiment 3
Load was the only variable to have a main effect on T1
performance, F(1, 16) =33.23, MSE =.004, p,.001. Neither Lag
nor Load was reliable (F’s,2.1). The interaction between Lag and
Load was marginally significant, F(1, 16) =4.14, MSE =.001,
p,.06. It seemed to indicate that the Load effect might have been
stronger at Lag 3 (7.2% difference) than at Lag 8 (4.8%). None of
the other interaction terms were significant (F’s,2.1). The left
panel of Figure 4 shows performance on T1 as a function of Lag.
Identification accuracy on T2 was reliably affected by Lag, F(1,
16) =59.52, MSE =.041, p,.001, as well as by Load, F(1, 16)
=8.46, MSE =.006, p,.01. The Lag effect showed a sizeable
attentional blink, with performance dropping to 39.4% at Lag 3,
from 66.2% at Lag 8. The Load effect was due to lower
performance with high memory load (50.8%) compared to low
load (54.7%). The main effect of Prime was only marginally
reliable, F(1, 16) =3.16, MSE =.007, p,.09, but the trend was in
the expected direction, with higher performance with priming
(54.1%) than without (51.5%). The interaction between Load and
Lag was again replicated, F(1, 16) =5.51, MSE =.004, p,.05.
Memory load had a larger effect at the short lag (6.4% difference)
Figure 4. Identification accuracy in percent correct in Experiment 3. The left panel shows T1 performance, and the right panel shows T2
performance, given that T1 was correctly responded to (T2|T1), plotted as a function of T1-T2 Lag. Black symbols represent the condition without
priming and white symbols represent the condition with priming. The remaining figure conventions are identical to those of Figure 2.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016696.g004
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and Prime was highly significant, F(1, 16) =20.69, MSE =.002,
p,.001. The priming effect was clearly present at Lag 3 (5.9%
benefit), but not at Lag 8 (20.8%). The remaining interactions
were not significant (F’s,1). The right panel of Figure 4 plots T2
performance as a function of Lag.
Finally, to investigate the possibility that the participants might
have used a guessing strategy, we performed an additional
analysis. Chris Olivers pointed out that observers could turn to
selecting an item from the memory set in case they missed T2
altogether, since the prime condition was relatively frequent. In
some conditions, this might indeed have increased task perfor-
mance. To test the possibility that this could account for the
priming effect, the Load 4 condition was selected for a comparison
between guessing ‘normally’ and guessing from the memory set.
Due to the distribution of T1-match and T2-match trials, guessing
rates would be approximately equal here (at just above 14%). An
ANOVA of this data still showed significant priming at Lag 3, F(1,
16) =5.66, MSE =.003, p,.05, with a magnitude of 4.8%. In
addition, an examination of the frequency of report of memory
items in trials in which this was inappropriate (i.e., without T2
priming) showed that these were not prevalent (just over 20%,
where chance would be just over 14%). Thus, this alternate
guessing strategy cannot account for the priming effect.
The outcome of Experiment 3 thus confirmed that the contents
of working memory can indeed affect attentional deployment. The
repetition of an item that had been part of the previously
memorized set facilitated the successful identification of T2. The
absence of the priming effect at Lag 8, despite comparatively
modest performance at that lag, and the presence of it at Lag 3
suggested that it might even be specific to the attentional blink.
These results might appear to contradict those of Koelewijn, van
der Burg, Bronkhorst, and Theeuwes [30], who showed a single
prime item before an RSVP and observed lower performance for
primes that matched T2, which they attributed to an instance of
negative priming. There is critical difference between this study
and the present one, however. In the present study, the memory
items were accessed actively, and this was required at the time of
T1, whereas in Koelewijn et al., the prime was held in memory
throughout the RSVP, which likely created a degree of generic
dual-task interference (see also [16,17]).
Discussion
The presently reported experiments showed how the contents of
working memory have a specific influence on attentional
deployment. First, the type of information in memory, and the
categorical similarity to the stimuli of the attentional task,
determined the degree of interference between working memory
load and the attentional blink. Specifically, categorical overlap
between working memory and attentional task increased blink
magnitude, compared to an otherwise identical condition without
categorical similarity. Second, when an item from the memory set
was repeated as the second target in the attentional task, it
attenuated the attentional blink.
The results are thus largely incompatible with theories that
presume the locus of interference between working memory and
attention lies at the level of executive control or attentional gating
[8,9]. If an executive control function was indeed necessary to
access memory, there seems to be little reason to begin with why it
would be different for specific types of information (in this case
color and alphanumerical items). Indeed, the working memory
model by Baddeley [24] features a universal ‘‘central executive’’.
However, the results of Experiment 1 and 2 could in principle be
accounted for by a model that assumes different gates or control
functions for different types of items. The interaction between
these gates might explain the interactions presently observed,
regardless of overall performance levels for each type of
information. More problematic for such an account were the
results of Experiment 3, which provided a clear indication that the
contents of memory guided and in this case facilitated attentional
selection even when only one type of information was used. An
account that rests on the assumption that a single control function
might underlie the interference observed between working
memory load and attentional performance, as well as accounts
resting on potential attentional set or gate switching effects, will be
hard pressed to offer a viable explanation for the present priming
effect. As noted, one might assume that searching for a digit
amongst letter distractors is similar to matching a specific digit to a
memorized set of digits, and that this similarity may complicate the
attentional gate switching process, which could account for the
results of Experiment 2 with some goodwill (although the lack of a
main effect of task remains somewhat problematic). However, this
account still fails to provide a reason for the priming effect
observed in Experiment 3.
Taken together, theories of temporal attention that reject the
idea that working memory is a causal factor in the attentional blink
cannot easily explain the present results. The findings do support
the principles of limited-processing (capacity-based) theories of the
blink [4–6]. It should be noted that although the present results
implicate working memory involvement in the attentional blink,
this is not necessarily the same as memory consolidation. Of
course, consolidation in memory certainly seems to be an instance
of an active memory operation, but the present paradigm did not
specifically implicate that particular function (i.e., consolidation
was not differentially needed to do the memory task). Thus,
theories that assume another type of causal mechanism for the
interaction between working memory and attention (e.g., an
inhibitory link; [4]) are able to accommodate the present results as
well.
Finally, it seems likely that memory-related factors are not the
sole cause of the blink, it is certain that other aspects of perception,
such as visual masking [14], and ones that are task-or response-
related [31,32], contribute to the phenomenon. In this light, it
would seem an interesting avenue for future research to quantify
the relative contribution of each the underlying variables to the
attentional blink.
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